Project for NABARD :
"Contract Farming as Means of Value-added Agriculture"
Final Report Approved by NABARD

Executive Summary

Objectives, Concerns and Methods Used

Contract farming is seen as an effective means of generating supplies for processing industries and exporters, with a substantial potential of adding value to agriculture in India. In view of this potential and its widespread practice abroad, Maharashtra Economic Development Council decided to examine in depth issues connected with contract farming, to facilitate contract farming arrangements to help achieve objectives of agriculture and horticulture development. This study was taken up with financial support from National Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development and assigned to Management Analytics, an independent research and consulting organisation. This Report documents its findings.
The study was to help define the applicability, equitability and enforceability of contract farming. It would attempt to identify crops and regions suited for contract farming, components of contracts, credit requirements and suitable institutional arrangements for disbursal and recovery, safeguards to ensure contract performance, measures against non-performance and arbitration procedures to resolve disputes
The study reviewed relevant experiences and remedies. It involved four in-depth case studies of commodities grown under contracts [Poplars under the Wimco programme in the North, mainly Punjab/Haryana; Tomatoes and chillies under Pepsico/HLL/Nijjer programmes in Punjab and Sun-sip/Cleanfoods (Ex Wimco) in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka; Seed multiplication under JK Agri-genetics, ProAgro and Nath Seeds in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Gujarat; Sugarcane cultivation and processing under Prawaranagar and Warnanagar co-operatives in Maharashtra, Modi Sugars in Uttar Pradesh and Sakthi Sugars in Tamil Nadu]. Sample surveys of about 50 contract and other growers for each commodity systems in the areas studied were also conducted as a part of the study.

Brief History of Contract Farming in India and Forms of Contracts

The colonial period saw the introduction of cash crops such as tea, coffee and rubber, poppy, and indigo in various parts of the country, mostly through a central, expatriate-owned estate surrounded by small outgrowers model. Most such arrangements exploited small peasantry and resulted in indenture and alienation in some instances. ITC introduced cultivation of Virginia tobacco in coastal Andhra Pradesh in the 1920s incorporating most elements of a fair contract farming system and met with good farmer response. This was replaced by auctions in 1984. Organised public and private seed companies, which emerged in the 1960s, had to necessarily depend on multiplication of seeds on individual farms under contract to them since they did not own lands. Faced with an acute shortage of soft wood, Wimco, the country’s sole mechanized match manufacturer, instituted an innovative farm-forestry scheme for the cultivation of poplars in Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. It met with a good farm response and success despite the trees being exotic to the regions.

Wimco also tried to procure tomatoes at the same time for its processing factories in the South through a halting recourse to contract purchase. Pepsico introduced tomato cultivation in Punjab in the 1990s under contract farming to obtain inputs for its paste-manufacturing facility established as a pre-condition to its entry into India. This was sold to Hindustan Lever in 2000, which had earlier acquired the Kissan tomato processing facility in Karnataka. Nijjer in Punjab and Bhilai Engineering in Madhya Pradesh also took up tomato contract cultivation programmes shortly after Pepsico. Contract farming was the strategy of choice for almost all food processing projects contemplated in the 1980s and 1990s, most of which never came up. Unreliable and uneconomic raw material availability has been their major handicap. Smaller projects involving specialised export crops, aromatics, medicinal plants and herbs, etc still actively use contracts in their own restricted areas.
Contract farming is again in vogue, and even tried for bulk production of subsistence crops, such as paddy-rice, maize and wheat. Punjab government has actively encouraged it as a means of crop diversification. Most such contracts now have specialised contract agencies as interfaces between farmers and input suppliers/crop purchasers.
Commodity co-operatives (dairies in Gujarat, sugarcane in Maharashtra), which emerged in the 1950s, provided most services envisaged under ideal contract farming to their members and bought back the supplies offered at contracted prices, although these were not strictly contract arrangements. They succeeded enormously, leading to their replication and compelling private companies also to adopt similar approaches. Contract farming is now considered to be a corrective to market imperfections and serving a useful purpose in India in its own limited sphere.
Contract farming covers loose buying arrangements, simple purchase agreements, supervised production with input provision, with possibly tied loans/advance and risk coverage, and managed production with input provision and tied loans/advance. Introduction of new crops and varieties as well as techniques of production also forms a part of some contracts. Quality parameters may be integral parts of contracts, but are not always understood properly. Defaults occur mainly through availability of alternative channels of disposal to farmers and sources of supply to buyers, which mere mention of exclusivity in contracts cannot overcome. Effective reciprocity of terms and conditions is not always assured. Contract agreements range from oral deals to formal, registered written contracts. Sugar and milk co-operatives provide significant social and community services as well.

Contract Farming Experiences
POPLARS
This programme, born of survival necessity of the sponsor, Wimco, the largest match manufacturer, had several strong features: a thorough, research-based approach, excellent extension approach, involvement of NABARD to provide refinance for farmer loans from lead banks, risk cover, clearly stated prices and purchase procedures, specially recruited and trained extension staff and solid backing from not just the Indian sponsor, but also its foreign parent. It was spread over three phases, between 1984 and 1995. It succeeded in meeting or exceeding targets, and creating great enthusiasm among farmers and demand among users, leading to competitive markets replacing contract purchase from 1995 onward.
TOMATOES
Wimco’s efforts at about the same time of securing tomato supplies through contracts in traditional growing areas of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka were lackluster and sporadic. Only a simple contract for purchase was involved, without input supply, extension or credit components. A decade later, Pepsico introduced tomatoes on a large scale in a non-traditional area, Punjab, with purchase contracts backed by research and extension support. It was closely followed by a similar programme by Nijjer. These met with enthusiastic farmer response and Punjab is now a major tomato-growing area. The companies also introduced chilli cultivation with success among a subset of their contract growers. Pepsico sold its operations to HLL in 2000. Only Nijjer still has contracts.
SEEDS
Organised seed trade had to adopt contract growing from its start in the 1960s, as it had no land of its own to multiply seeds. This large business now survives only on contracts, which are formal and explicit, covering all relevant factors. Seed contracts are now with groups, not individuals, which helps not only in ensuring supplies, but even more importantly, meeting quality standards and avoiding disputes.
SUGARCANE
Enlightened farmer leaders integrated cane growing and processing in the 1950s through the establishment of sugar co-operatives in Maharashtra. They now provide inputs, extension, advances, and supervise/manage harvesting as well as cane delivery to factory. Farmers believe their prices to be remunerative and bonus and other social services offered as added incentives for loyalty. The larger and more concerned private companies elsewhere in the country, especially in Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh have taken the co-operatives as models and now offer similar, though not all, services to their growers.

Impact of Contract Farming
NEW CROP ESTABLISHMENT
Poplar cultivation is now a stable, widely accepted agro-forestry activity covering over 75,000 ha/year. There is a competitive market, which meets most of farmers’ expectations.

Tomatoes are currently cultivated in Punjab on ca 25,000 ha, with a crop size of 5,00,000 t.

INDUSTRY RAW MATERIAL
Seeds are the business of over 150 companies, which survive on contracts and have a combined annual turnover of over Rs 2,500 crore. Companies studied have reported healthy volumes and profits and attribute them to contracts;

Sugarcane cultivation is based on long-standing relationships between farmers and [processors; near contractual relations have led to assured supply and prosperity for all.

HIGHER PRODUCTIVITY, INCOMES
Tomato contract farmers’ average yield is 25 - 50 per cent higher than the state average, while their per ha income was 40 per cent higher than that for the control group;
Sugarcane growers reported higher than average yields, recoveries in contract areas, and bonuses have meant higher incomes.

FARMER PERCEPTIONS
The sample surveys showed that contracts are not always well understood, with prices, quality stipulations, and respective responsibilities being the main areas of confusion. Overall, however, farmers were distinctly satisfied with contracts and were ready to repeat them in general and with the same parties in particular, if offered. This was also reflected in the reported average length of association, which was as high as 28 years for sugarcane growers. Farmers stated higher incomes and prestige of association with a large organisation to be the main benefits of contracts. Nevertheless, farmers firmly believed that buyers were responsible for disputes, underlying the antagonistic nature of contracts in general.

Contract Farming: Effectiveness, Pre-requisites and Problems

Contract farming is one among several possible interfaces between crop cultivation and its processing and consumption. It is a powerful means of introduction of new crops or farm technologies, especially when both marketing and production uncertainties predominate.
Contract farming helps when markets do not exist or are underdeveloped; conversely, contracts diminish in importance with development of competitive markets. Contract farming works when specific quality requirements must be met. Contracts are effective when there is no zero-sum game (one party’s gain at the expense of the other). They are ideal for a win-win situation, since they represent a natural mutual dependency. Contracts succeed when they contain fair risk transfer or coverage measures and trust relationships built over long periods. They are most effective when they are critical to the continued operations of the buyer organisation. They are deficient when their contribution to the buyer is minor.
The effectiveness of contracts depends on the offer of a fair price and adequate risk coverage. Other factors helping adherence to contracts include exclusiveness, provision of proprietary planting materials or inputs, and a strong, self-regulatory social systems among growers. Contract farming is an exciting way of marrying small-farm efficiency to scale economies of processing and marketing. It is an acceptable via media for corporate ownership and could be a boon to processing industry, if properly designed and implemented. It would help ensure traceability and trackability for exports, which would be major consideration in 2005.
Many factors also limit the utility of contract farming. Thousands of contracts are needed for securing even modest quantities. The large, quality-indifferent Indian market for fresh commodities acts as a main roadblock, leading to a “Feast-or-Famine” syndrome; shortages cause supply contracts to be flouted, and surpluses cause gluts at the buyer’s doorstep.
This also causes problems in meeting stringent SPS requirements, which will become an increasingly important consideration. Legal procedures governing such contracts are seen to be one-sided, with defaults difficult to pin. Little if any recourse to courts or other legal avenues is seen as feasible. These reasons explain the relative absence of international players in this segment of the Indian economy.

Contract Farming in Perspective
It is a step in evolution of competitive marketing and not permanent substitute for it. Developed markets based on adequate infrastructure, proper information flows, appropriate governance, organised futures are clearly the desired set of institutions. Ideally, contract farming is self-liquidating, as in case of poplars, as well as tomatoes in Punjab. The continued presence of quasi-contractual arrangements in sugarcane cultivation is clearly a result of the completely administered nature of the commodity subsystem.

Application Areas for Contract Farming
The following are the prime candidates, each of which is marked by an absence or an underdevelopment of competitive domestic markets:

• Seed multiplication;
• Organic foods, vegetables, fruits, and exotic produce/plants;
• Export crops;
• Aromatics, herbal and medicinal plants;
• Other cropping activities with specific requirements of quality/cultivation practices.

The same consideration rules out commodities for established mass markets, such as cereals, common fruits and vegetables, etc, as candidates for contract cultivation

Interface with Institutional Finance
Increased credit flow to agriculture is constrained by weakness and ineffectiveness of institutions, poor credit absorption capacity of the peasantry given the low resource base and limited risk bearing ability, the relatively high cost of delivery of credit and eventual recovery due to the diffused and dispersed distribution of the end-users. Market and production uncertainties lead to defaults and add to farmers’ desperation.
Contract farming in general helps reduce market risk associated with crop cultivation and is thus a possible instrument of credit deepening. The presence of a third party could lead to outsourcing some preliminaries of credit disbursal and help reduce the cost. The buyers’ commitment to purchase substantially reduces the risk of default to the lender. Therefore, credit institutions would be interested in using contract farming as a means of improving credit disbursal and meeting the mandatory targets for priority sector lending.

Yet their actual involvement in contract farming is limited because there are not many well-planned contract farming schemes with adequate safeguards for all concerned, backed by credible sponsors, and previous experience has not been all positive. The cases studied suggest the following desirable steps to expand institutional support to contract farming:
NICHE APPROACH
The target crop activity should be well-defined, with manageable number of growers who preferably share some other common traits to economise the effort required to create awareness and interest among them.
SERIOUSNESS OF SPONSOR
Bankers need to be particularly careful in selecting the right sponsors. The best candidates should possess persistence, superior knowledge base and back-up, seriousness of intent as demonstrated by the criticalness of the activity to their own survival and sufficient financial, organisational and human resources to see the programme through the long haul. Size and previous reputations of an organisation are no guarantee of their commitment to the specific scheme.
WORKABLE, PARTICIPATIVE PROCEDURES AND PAPERWORK
Desirable sponsors need to participate as equals with bankers in the preliminaries, helping perform some tasks without unduly taxing the bankers’ constrained resources.
DEALING WITH GROUPS AS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS
Dealing with groups is the preferred, if not the only, way of obtaining acceptable contract performance, through the positive use of the substantial group synergy. This also highlights the need to work on niches, which would help form groups.
RISK COVERAGE: CRITICAL!
A suitable risk coverage mechanism has to be an integral part of the contract farming scheme. The entry of a large number of private insurance companies in general and agriculture insurance areas opens up numerous possibilities for innovation. Bankers should seek the involvement of an insurance agency to evolve a tailor-made, innovative approach to cover potential risk and create greater comfort for the farmer.
REPAYMENT: ALERTNESS TO CHANGES
Most contract farming schemes run on a tri-partite arrangement between sponsors, farmers and bankers. Suitable strategies to ensure no leakages out of the system (or devising methods to recover funds even in the event of a leakage) are necessary. A continuing monitoring of the market environment throughout the growing season and an arsenal of actions to countervail the impact of such leakages are required.
AVOID LITIGATION
Litigation to recover money on default would be largely fruitless and quite expensive. Bankers need to support measures such as those suggested for conflict resolution to ensure higher and prompt repayment. Bankers must certainly avoid the temptation to attach the borrowers poor belongings.

Model Contract Farming Scheme

New Measures and Regulated Markets
The Regulated Markets legislation sought to eliminate numerous marketing malpractices by allowing transactions only in well-identified market yards and under the supervision of a statutory market Committee. Over time, procedures and paper work became focal points of market regulators, rather than facilitation and enlarging of trade and regulated markets became bottlenecks. Limited access to open trade adversely affects production of new and diversified crops. Confining trade to the existing yards and traders to recognised ones may not suit new crops with new spatial patterns and trading entities. Freeing Indian agriculture from such constraints through appropriate reform is an idea whose time has come.
The draft legislation under circulation recommends recognition of additional sub-market yards, including those managed by persons or bodies other than market committees as markets under the act and the establishment of special markets for specific commodities and special committees to govern them. This does not quite meet the purpose. It would still require the physical movement of a commodity between the place it is produced and a market, instead of an unrestricted direct movement between the points of origin and processing or consumption, to help reduce cost, delays, wastage, and quality deterioration. The thrust of the proposed measures, albeit unintended, is to increase the extent of over-administration of the system, rather than to unshackle it.
A desirable contract-farming approach requires several actions on part of sponsors as well as administrators (financial institutions roles and actions have been listed above):
Sponsor Issues for Action
Sponsors need to define unambiguously the type and nature of the contract, as well as areas and periods covered at the outset. They have to list the scope of their own activities as also those of the growers, and their respective performance obligations.
Contracts must clearly specify:

•Quantities involved (on volume, area or entire crop basis), delivery schedule, points of delivery and procedures to be followed in the event of shortfalls or excesses;
• Modes and responsibilities of grading, packing and transport and costs;
• Prices: fixed in advance of season, flexible prices, spot, consignment, split;
• Payment modalities: time, form, hold-backs, if any;
• Incentives based on quality and/or time performance;
• Advances and their recoveries;
• Insurance, market fee and other related costs;
• Provisions in case of excess or short supply;
• Indicative net realisation by farmer.

Sponsors must focus on groups, and not individuals. The agreements should be simple, short and devoid of legal jargon. They must not involve property liens or attachments under any circumstances.
Development/Support Issues

• Processors or sponsors must equip themselves with suitable R&D, efforts, especially concerning agronomy and the required extension drive;
• All successful contract farming is based on appropriate pricing. Given the often cyclical nature of agriculture production, sponsors could consider establishing a price stabilisation fund as a desirable step to overcome this problem;
• No contract farming scheme would succeed in the short run. Persistence for a reasonable period extending over several years is essential.
Administration
• State governments must recognise contract arrangements of all types, and exempt them from the purview of the current or amended APMC acts.
• There should be a simple registration of all contracts with the concerned district agriculture office. This is to be performed by the buyer, to avail of the exemption from the Act. There is no need to ensure formalisation or government registration and supervision of growers’ groups.
Conflict Resolution

The best conflict resolution is avoidance of conflicts, as assumed in the logic of the above recommendations. Nevertheless, some conflicts might still arise, which need to be simply, effectively and quickly resolved.

THREE-STAGE PROCESS

• Intra-group discussion and settlement
• Simple arbitration on the lok adalat model, with a local First Class Judicial Magistrate assisted by farmer/sponsor representatives, and one eminent person of area acting as the arbitration forum;
• One appeal to district judge/magistrate
The entire process must be completed in a maximum of three months, and awards under it must have judicial sanction of a decree of a civil court and must be enforceable. Legal practitioners must not be allowed to participate in the process. It should not be subject to Indian Contracts Act or further review.


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